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INTRODUCTION

In 2011, the Florida Legislature replaced the Florida Growth
Management Act with the Community Planning Act' (CPA). The
previous Florida Growth Management Act was criticized for
encouraging urban sprawl, in part because of its concurrency
requirements. Although this iteration of Florida's attempt at growth
*
Kathryn Barkett Rossmell is a graduate of the University of Florida College of Law
and a Florida Attorney.
1. Part II of Chapter 163 of the Florida Statutes is referred to as the "Community
Planning Act." FLA. STAT. § 163.3161(1) (2011).
2. See, e.g., Ruth L. Steiner, Florida's Transportation Concurrency: Are the Tools
Adequate to Meet the Needfor CoordinatedLand Use and TransportationPlanning? 12 U. FLA.
215
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management drastically differs from the last in many respects, the two
acts have at least one significant thing in common: they encourage
urban sprawl.
The Florida Legislature defined urban sprawl for the first time in the
CPA. Urban sprawl means:
[A] development pattern characterized by low density,
automobile-dependent development with either a single use or
multiple uses that are not functionally related, requiring the
extension of public facilities and services in an inefficient
to provide a clear separation between urban
manner, and failing
3
uses.
and rural
However, the CPA also lists the thirteen primary indicators of urban
sprawl 4 that were formerly found in Rule 9J-5 of the Florida
Administrative Code, and eight factors indicating discouragement of the
proliferation of urban sprawl. 5 The achievement of any four of these
J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 269, 270, 296, (2001) (stating that the transportation concurrency
management system is seen as contributing to urban sprawl) (citing Florida Department of
Transportation, The Transportationand Land Use Study Committee: FinalReport, 20 (1999)).
3. FLA. STAT. § 163.3164(51).
4. Id. § 163.3177(6)(a)(9)(a)(I)-(XIII). The thirteen primary indicators are used to
determine whether the plan or plan amendment: (I) Promotes, allows, or designates for
development substantial areas of the jurisdiction to develop as low-intensity, low-density, or
single-use development or uses. (I1) Promotes, allows, or designates significant amounts of
urban development to occur in rural areas at substantial distances from existing urban areas
while not using undeveloped lands that are available and suitable for development. (III)
Promotes, allows, or designates urban development in radial, strip, isolated, or ribbon patterns
generally emanating from existing urban developments. (IV) Fails to adequately protect and
conserve natural resources, such as wetlands, floodplains, native vegetation, environmentally
sensitive areas, natural groundwater aquifer recharge areas, lakes, rivers, shorelines, beaches,
bays, estuarine systems, and other significant natural systems. (V) Fails to adequately protect
adjacent agricultural areas and activities, including silviculture, active agricultural and
silvicultural activities, passive agricultural activities, and dormant, unique, and prime farmlands
and soils. (VI) Fails to maximize use of existing public facilities and services. (VII) Fails to
maximize use of future public facilities and services. (VIII) Allows for land use patterns or
timing which disproportionately increase the cost in time, money, and energy of providing and
maintaining facilities and services, including roads, potable water, sanitary sewer, stormwater
management, law enforcement, education, health care, fire and emergency response, and general
government. (IX) Fails to provide a clear separation between rural and urban uses. (X)
Discourages or inhibits infill development or the redevelopment of existing neighborhoods and
communities. (XI) Fails to encourage a functional mix of uses. (XII) Results in poor
accessibility among linked or related land uses. (XIII) Results in the loss of significant amounts
of functional open space.
5. Id. § 163.3177(6)(a)(9)(b)(I)-(VIII). The eight factors are: (I) Directs or locates
economic growth and associated land development to geographic areas of the community in a
manner that does not have an adverse impact on and protects natural resources and ecosystems.
(II) Promotes the efficient and cost-effective provision or extension of public infrastructure and
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eight factors signifies that a future land use plan or amendment is not
urban sprawl. 6
Deterring urban sprawl has been part of Florida's growth
management plan for years, 7 and a detailed explanation of the reasons is
unnecessary in light of the extensive literature on the subject. However,
a brief note on the importance of discouraginq urban sprawl brings into
focus the reasons this legislation is significant.
On a national scale, urban sprawl has been linked to everything from
obesity, 9 to endangering wildlife' ° to a myriad of social, economic and
other problems. 1 In Florida specifically, the sprawl of residential and
agricultural land has whittled the delicate Everglades down to roughly
half its original size a harm that the Federal and Florida Governments
are trying to undo.'i A report generated for the former Department of
Community Affairs (DCA) explains that sprawl not only generates
services. (III) Promotes walkable and connected communities and provides for compact
development and a mix of uses at densities and intensities that will support a range of housing
choices and a multimodal transportation system, including pedestrian, bicycle, and transit, if
available. (IV) Promotes conservation of water and energy. (V) Preserves agricultural areas and
activities, including silviculture, and dormant, unique, and prime farmlands and soils. (VI)
Preserves open space and natural lands and provides for public open space and recreation needs.
(VII) Creates a balance of land uses based upon demands of the residential population for the
nonresidential needs of an area. (VIII) Provides uses, densities, and intensities of use and urban
form that would remediate an existing or planned development pattern in the vicinity that
constitutes sprawl or if it provides for an innovative development pattern such as transit-oriented
developments or new towns as defined in s. 163.3164.
6. Id. § 163.3184(9)(b).
7. See David L. Powell, Growth Management: Florida's Past as Prologuefor the
Future,28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 519, 535 (2001) (citing Governor's Task Force on Urban Growth
Patterns, Final Report (1989)) (further citations omitted).
8. This Note does not focus on whether urban sprawl is inherently good or bad for the
state of Florida; rather, it focuses on the fact that the Florida Legislature stated that it intended to
use these statutes to discourage urban sprawl, but actually did the opposite. Because of Florida's
history of trying to deter urban sprawl, and the Legislature's statement that it wishes to
discourage urban sprawl, this Note works off the assumption that urban sprawl should be
discouraged in Florida.
9. Reid Ewing et al., Relationship Between Urban Sprawl and Physical Activity,
Obesity, and Morbidity, AM.

J. HEALTH

PROMOTION,

Sept./Oct.

2003,

available at

http://smartgrowth.umd.edu/research/pdffEwingSchmidKillingsworthEtAI_Sprawlbesity Date
NA.pdf.
10. Reid Ewing & John Kostyack, Endangered by Sprawl: How Runaway Development
Threatens America's Wildlife, NAT'L WILDLIFE FED'N, SMART GROWTH AM. & NATURESERVE

(2005).
11. See, e.g., Patrick Gallagher, The Environmental, Social, and Cultural Impacts of
Sprawl, 15 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 219 (2001); Robert H. Freilich & Bruce G. Peshoff, The Social
Costs of Sprawl, 29 URn. LAW. 183 (1997).
12. See, e.g., Robert Walker, Urban Sprawl and the Natural Areas Encroachment:
Linking Land Cover Change and Economic Development in the Florida Everglades, 37
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 357 (2001).
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significant costs through the creation of roads, sewer lines, and water
lines, but can also lead to problems, such as depriving lower income
families or individuals of access to community resources, facilities, and
services.13 Urban sprawl also increases traffic congestion, time spent in
traffic, and energy consumption. 14 In a time of state and personal budget
cuts, expenditures on items such as new roads and gas for personal cars
gain even greater significance.
Although the stated intent of the Legislature was to discourage urban
sprawl, 15 the new statutes actually allow and even encourage forms of
development that were previously considered urban sprawl. The eight
factors effectively eviscerate the thirteen primary indicators and the
definition, making it easier to develop further away from existing urban
areas. By including both a definition of urban sprawl and the thirteen
primary indicators, the Legislature has failed to present a clear picture
of what urban sprawl actually looks like. This creates confusion about
whether the definition or the thirteen primary indicators controls the
determination of urban sprawl, giving developers plenty of wiggle room
to get approval for projects that would have been considered sprawl in
the past. Overall, the Legislature has not only drafted a rule that fails to
prevent urban sprawl, but may actually encourage it.
This Note will use a series of hypothetical situations to highlight
some of the shortcomings in the statute as enacted. It will also cover
some of the history of defining urban sprawl, the process by which a
comprehensive plan or comprehensive plan amendment gets approved,
and how the new statute functions with regard to discouraging urban
sprawl. Ultimately, the loopholes created by the Legislature render the
thirteen primary indicators useless in many circumstances. In this way,
the Florida Legislature accidently encouraged urban sprawl.., again.
I. THE HISTORY OF DEFINING URBAN SPRAWL

Although a definition of urban sprawl is new to the Florida Statutes,
it had been defined in several other places before the adoption of the
CPA. Urban sprawl had been defined in one case as "the extension of
urban-type
development
into rural, agricultural,
or other
underdeveloped or sparsely developed lands in a haphazard
development pattern in which land uses are not functionally related to

13. Reid Ewing, Characteristics,Causes, and Effects of Sprawl: A LiteratureReview, 5
URB.ECOLOGY 519, 525-26 (2008).
14. Id. at 527-28.
15. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a)(9) (2011) (stating "The future land use element and any
amendment to the future land use element shall discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl.").
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each other.'

16

A technical memo issued by DCA in 1989 defined urban sprawl as
"scattered, untimely, poorly planned urban development that occurs in
urban fringe and rural areas and frequently invades lands important for
environmental and natural resource protection." 7
Additionally, the Florida Administrative Code defined urban sprawl
as:
urban development or uses which are located in predominantly
rural areas, or rural areas interspersed with generally lowintensity or low-density urban uses, and which are characterized
by one or more of the following conditions: (a) The premature or
poorly planned conversion of rural land to other uses; (b) The
creation of areas of urban development or uses which are not
functionally related to land uses which predominate the adjacent
area; or (c) The creation of areas of urban development or uses
which fail to maximize the use of existing public facilities or the
use of areas within which public services are currently provided.
Urban sprawl is typically manifested in one or more of the
following land use or development patterns: Leapfrog or
scattered development; ribbon or strip commercial or other
development; or large expanses of predominantly
low-intensity,
8
low-density, or single-use development.'
16. Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n of Brevard, Inc. v. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 585
So. 2d 965, 968 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Home Builders also explained that the most common
patterns of urban sprawl are the ribbon pattern, leapfrog pattern, and concentric circle pattern.
Id. at 968-69.
17. See Fla. E. Coast Indus., Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 1994 WL 1027591, 677
So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (Fla. Div. Admin. Hrgs. Feb. 18, 1994) (upholding a proposed
rule defining urban sprawl in 9J-5).
18. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN.r.9J-5.003(134) (2010) (repealed 2011).
In the ribbon pattern, development not functionally or proximately related to
other non-urban development in the area extends in ribbons or strips along
certain roads and away from urban development.
In the leapfrog pattern, development not functionally or proximately related to
other non-urban development in the area leaps from urban development so as to
leave significant amounts of rural, agricultural, or other undeveloped or
sparsely developed land between existing urban development and the scattered
leapfrog development. The concentric circle pattern is similar except that the
development not functionally or proximately related to other non-urban
development in the area assumes the pattern of concentric circles, such as along
rural roads bypassing an urban area, and is characteristically more exclusively
low-density residential.
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So although the Florida Statutes have never defined urban sprawl,
Florida officials have attempted to describe the term in other contexts.
II. THE PROCESS FOR EVALUATING A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OR
PLAN AMENDMENT

One of the changes between the CPA and the Growth Management
Act was an alteration of the process for approving a comprehensive plan
amendment. Under the CPA, the state's land planning agency, The
Department of Community Planning (DCP), has substantially less
power and a much smaller scope of permissible subjects on which it
may comment than the state land planning agency (at that time, DCA)
had under the Growth Management Act.
A. Under the Growth Management Act
Until the CPA was created in 2011, the thirteen primary indicators of
urban sprawl were found in the infamous Rule 9J-5 of the Florida
Administrative Code. 19 Local governments would submit proposed
comprehensive plans or plan amendments to DCA and other state
agencies. 2 To determine if a plan amendment would create urban
sprawl, DCA would examine a plan amendment to see if it "trip[ped]"
or "trigger[ed]" any of the thirteen primary indicators. 21 If so, DCA
would then consider the extent to which the tripped indicators showed
that the amendment did not discourage sprawl, or in other words,
induced sprawl.22 If DCA decided that an amendment did induce
sprawl, then it looked at development controls in the comprehensive
plan or in the proposed amendment itself to see if the controls offset the
inducement of sprawl.23 If DCA found the offset to be insufficient, then
the amendment was found not to be consistent with the state
comprehensive plan of discouraging urban sprawl.24 Although possible,
that triping only a few indicators would lead to a
it was unlikely sprawl.
urban
finding or
Other state agencies had thirty days from receiving the amendment

Home Builders, 585 So. 2d at 968-69.
19. FLA. ADMIN. CODE. ANN. r.9J-5.006(5).
20. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(3) (repealed 2011).
21. Sierra Club v. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, No. 03-0150GM, 2006 WL 1674277, at *29
(Fla. Div. Admin. Hrgs. June 16, 2006).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 30.
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to review plan amendments and submit their comments to DCA.26 DCA
had sixty days after receiving the amendment to review the changes and
the comments of other agencies. 27 DCA also had the power to raise
objections to issues under other agencies' areas of expertise.28 DCA
then consolidated its findings 29 and the findings of the other agencies
into a report called the Objections, Recommendations, and Comments
(ORC Report). 30 Next, DCA transmitted the ORC Report back to the
local government, after which the local government had 60 or 120 days
to adopt or adopt with changes the proposed amendment, depending on
the type of amendment. 31 Then DCA had another chance to review it for
compliance with the comprehensive plan based on its earlier written
comments to the local government or any changes made by the local
government to the comprehensive plan. 32 DCA then entered a notice of
intent stating whether it planned to find that the plan or amendment was
in compliance or not in compliance with the comprehensive plan. 33 If
DCA entered a notice of intent to find the amendment in compliance,
then an affected person 34 could file a petition, and an administrative law
judge would approve the amendment if the local government's
determination of compliance was fairly debatable. 35 If DCA entered a
notice of intent to find the amendment not in compliance, then an
administrative hearing was held to determine compliance. The local
government's decision of compliance was to be sustained unless it was
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the plan or plan
amendment did not comply. 36 DCA also had the opportunity to mediate
at this stage.37
In summary, under the old Growth Management Act, DCA had two
chances to review amendments and had broad powers to make
objections, recommendations, and comments on a variety of issues
relating to the proposed comprehensive plan or plan amendment. In
26. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(4) (repealed 2011).
27. Id. § 163.3184(6)(c).
28. Id. Telephone Interview with James Stansbury, DCP Community Planning Team
(Southeast Team), Nov. 15, 2011 [hereinafter Stansbury Interview].
29. FLA. STAT. § 163.3 184(6)(c) (repealed 2011).
30. Id. § 163.3184(6)(c) (stating that the state land planning agency shall issue a report
giving its objections, recommendations, and comments regarding the proposed amendment,
giving rise to the name of the report).
31. Id. § 163.3184(7)(a).
32. Id. § 163.3184(7)(b).
33. Id.§ 163.3184(8).
34. The definition of an affected person included the local government, and required that
the person have already objected to the amendment prior to this stage. Id. § 163.3184(1)(a). That
is still true in the CPA.
35. Id. § 163.3184(9)(a).
36. Id. § 163.3184(10)(a).
37. Id. § 163.3184(10)(c).
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some cases, DCA also had the chance to mediate. Administrative law
judges also determined compliance in hearings following the local
government's determination of compliance.
B. Under the Community PlanningAct
In the same 2011 amendments that created the CPA, the Legislature
also formed the Department of Economic Opportunity to serve in the
place of several state agencies, including DCA. The functions of DCA
were transferred into DCP within the Department of Economic
Opportunity. DCP is now the state land planning agency. 38 But that was
not the only change.
The Community Planning Act has two main review processes for
amendments to the comprehensive plan: State Coordinated Review and
Expedited State Review. 39 The State Coordinated Review process is
similar to the review process under the old Growth Management Act.4 °
There are, however, a few noteworthy changes. First, DCP has only five
days after the local government submits the amendment package to
review it for "completeness,' ' 4 rather than the forty-five days under the
Growth Management Act to review it for compliance. Also, the plan or
plan amendment goes into effect upon DCP's notice of intent, rather
than after the entry of an administrative order and if challenged, when
Commission 4 enters a final order
DCP or the Administrative
43
determining compliance.
Under Expedited State Review, state agencies have thirty days to
review the plans and send their comments to the local government and
DCP. 44 DCP must also complete its comments within those thirty days.
Note that this is half the time the land planning agency had under the
old rules, and does not allow DCP extra time to review the other
agencies' comments before completing its report. Moreover, the statute
limits DCP's comments to "important state resources and facilities that
''5
are outside the jurisdiction of other commenting state agencies.
(Recall that under the old rules, DCA could comment on concerns under
the purview of other state agencies if it felt it was necessary. 46 ) DCP
38. Laws of Florida,ch. 2011-142; http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/profiles/61 10/.
39. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184. There is also a small-scale review process for qualifying plan
amendments. Id. § 163.3184(2)(b).
40. Id. § 163.3184(4) (repealed 2011); Stansbury Interview, supra note 28.
41.

FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(3)(c)(3).

42. The "Administrative Commission" means the Governor and the Cabinet, who act on
the majority vote of the Governor and at least three other members. Id. § 163.3164(2).
43. Id. § 163.3184(3)(c)(4).
44. Id. § 163.3184(3)(b)(2).
45. Id. § 163.3184(3)(b)(4)(h).
46. Id. § 163.3184(2); Stansbury Interview, supra note 28.
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may also comment on countervailing planning policies and objectives
served by the amendment that balance against adverse impacts.47
Additionally, the statute no longer directs that DCP assess the sprawl
indicators in light of land uses, local conditions, development controls,
and innovative and flexible planning and development strategies.48
Even though DCP is limited to commenting on important state
resources and facilities, DCP considers urban growth part of that
category.49 So DCP may still comment on urban growth, but the eight
factors will control its reasoning. DCP will also use input from the other
agencies in applying the primary indicators and factors, 50 but does not
have the same scope of power as it did under the Growth Management
Act.
After DCP has submitted its comments to the local government, the
local government has 180 days to hold a second public hearing
regarding the adoption of the plan amendments. If the local government
51
fails to do so, the amendments are deemed to have been withdrawn.
Plan amendments adopted by the local government are then sent back to
the commenting state agencies, including DCP, which mainly checks
for completeness of the plan amendment package. 52 The agencies then
53
have just five days to notify the local government of any deficiencies.
The adopted amendment becomes effective thirty-one days after DCP
informs the local government the package is complete. In the case of a
timely challenge, the amendment does not become effective until DCP
or the Administrative Commission
enters a final judgment stating the
54
amendment is in compliance.
Overall, under the CPA, DCP has less time and more limited ability
to comment than DCA did under the Growth Management Act.
Additionally, the Administrative Commission, rather than an
administrative judge, decides if an amendment complies with the
comprehensive plan in the event of a disagreement.
Il. THE NEW STATUTE-How IT [DOESN'T] WORK

Although the new statute does not explicitly say in what order to
proceed or which part controls, it is clear that the eight factors are the
47. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(3)(b)(4)(h).
48. Linda Loomis Shelley & Karen Brodeen, The Home Rule Redux: the Community
PlanningAct of 2011, 85 FLA. B.J. 49 (2011).
49. Stansbury Interview, supra note 28.
50. Id.
51. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(3)(c)(1).
52. Id. § 163.3184(3)(c)(3).
53. Id.
54. Id § 163.3184(3)(c)(4).
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first step in determining what constitutes urban sprawl and are the
controlling part of the statute. If four of the eight factors are met, the
amendment will not be deemed urban sprawl. If an amendment does not
meet four of the eight factors, then it is not clear whether the definition
or the thirteen primary indicators is the next step. The opaqueness of the
statute ultimately creates four overlapping categories of plan
amendments, allows development that was traditionally considered
urban sprawl to be determined to discourage urban sprawl, and may
require some amendments that look less like urban sprawl to go though
more steps to get that determination.
A. Step 1: The Eight Factors
The eight factors are clearly the most powerful part of the statute,
and the guillotine that killed the thirteen primary indicators. If any four
of the eight factors are met, then the future land use element or plan
amendment shall be determinedto discourage the proliferationof urban
sprawl.55 "Shall" leaves little room for doubt: 56 if the four factors are
met, regardless of how many of the thirteen primary indicators are
triggered, or whether the project fits the definition of urban sprawl
found in section 163.3164(51), it will be determined to discourage
urban sprawl.57
Although the Notes of Decisions and Legislative History reveal little
about the intent of the Legislature, the Final Bill Analysis of HB 7207
(the bill that became the CPA) promulgated by the Florida House of
55. Id. § 163.3177(6)(a)(9)(b).
56. See, e.g., Neal v. Bryant, 149 So. 2d 529, 532 (Fla. 1962) (stating that "shall" has a
mandatory connotation unless it is in regards to an immaterial matter or matter of convenience
rather than substance). Compare Allied Fid. Ins. Co. v. State, 415 So. 2d 109, 110-11 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1982) (stating that "shall" is mandatory unless it will lead to a ridiculous conclusion).
57. In fact, on January 24, 2012, the Florida Division of Administrative Hearings
Promulgated a Recommended Order stating
whatever the outcome with regard to urban sprawl of the application of the
the determination in this
thirteen indicators in section 163.3177(6)(a)9.a ....
proceeding under section 163.3177(6)(a)9.b., controls. This means that even
had the application of the 13 Indicators resulted in a finding that the [local plan]
does not discourage urban sprawl, the incorporation of four of the listed factors
in the [local plan's] development pattern or urban form leads to an ultimate
determination under the statute that the [local plan] discourages the
proliferation of urban sprawl.
Herrin v. Volusia County, 2012 WL 256233, No. 10-2419 GM, No. 11-2527GM (Fla. Div. of
Admin. Hearings, Jan. 24, 2012) (consolidated cases). For the final order, see 2012 WL
1303679, DOAH No. 11-2627GM, Final Order No. DEO-12-021 (Fla. Div. of Admin.
Hearings, Mar. 29, 2012).

FROM TOOLS TO TOYS-TIE GUTTING OF THE INFAMOUS PRIMARYINDICATORS

Representatives sheds a small ray of light on the subject. 58 On the
subject of urban sprawl, the Final Analysis provides critical insight into
the Bill.
1. Effect of the Bill
This bill provides a definition of urban sprawl and incorporates,
from rule 9J-5, FAC, the thirteen primary indicators that a plan or plan
amendment does not discourage urban sprawl. In addition, this bill adds
eight indicators that a plan or plan amendment discourages urban
sprawl. If the future land use element or a plan amendment achieves
four of these eight indicators within its development pattern or urban
form it will be determined to discourage the proliferation of urban
sprawl. 59
The use of the phrase "will be determined" signifies that the eight
indicators control the finding. In other words, this also shows that if a
project meets the definition of urban sprawl, or triggers a significant
number of the primary indicators, but also meets four of the eight
factors, then it is not considered urban sprawl. It is clear that the eight
factors control. So the first step for developers and practitioners will be
to try to meet any four of the eight factors. If they can achieve that, then
they need not go further. The project is not urban sprawl.
That is precisely how the Legislature encouraged urban sprawl-by
creating an enormous loophole that renders the thirteen primary
indicators useless. Here is an example.
2. Hypothetical #1
Suppose Developer #1 wants to purchase land to create a "new
urbanist" community. He buys the land very cheap from a developer
who originally purchased it to create a series of subdivisions, but was
unable to construct them before the economic recession. Infrastructure
is not installed. This land is seven miles from the nearest town, and in
between the new development and the town is agriculture land (but
because of the work the seller did on it, the land purchased has not been
used for agriculture for many years). Developer #1 is unconcerned with
the distance; he plans to mix uses (both commercial and residential) in
58. Final Bill Analysis, Representative Aubuchon, at 5, http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/
Sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=h7207z.EAC.DOCX&DocumentType=Analysis
&BillNumber=7207&Session=2011. However, the document clearly states "this document does
not reflect the intent or official position of the bill sponsor [author of the analysis] or the House
of Representatives." Therefore, it is unlikely that any court would use this document to find
legislative intent.
59. Id. (emphasis added).
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his new community, and strives to create a walkable/bikable
community. He intends to construct everything to the LEED platinum
level, and so will promote conservation of water and energy. Because
the land will not intrude on existing agriculture and is not currently used
for agriculture, it preserves agricultural areas surrounding it. Moreover,
his design is ring-shaped, with a large open park in the center. His
plans, however, do not meet the criteria to be called a "new town" under
the community planning act 60 because it will not have enough
office/commercial space to provide a full range of public services, and
will not include all major land use categories.
According to the statute, this meets four of the eight factors-Ill, IV,
V, and VI of § 163.3177(6)(a)(9)(b)-and so is determined to
discourage urban sprawl even though it is seven miles from the nearest
town. A look at the thirteen primary indicators reveals that it arguably
triggers factors II, III, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, and XII. But the thirteen
primary indicators do not matter at all in this case-DCP never gets to
that step. The project met four of the eight factors, so it is not urban
sprawl. This type of development was historically called leapfrog or
isolated urban sprawl; now it is deemed to discourage urban sprawl.
These small developments are not unheard of. Take, for example, the
Town of Tioga near Gainesville, Florida. Town of Tioga is a masterplanned community that touts "green living" and mixed uses as
highlights of the community.61 But despite its claim of being "located in
the heart of Gainesville, Florida," it is actually about four miles outside
of the nearest border of the Gainesville city limits. 62 Although it does
have a long list of shops and offices, necessities such as grocery stores
and insurance companies are notably lacking.

60. FLA. STAT. § 163.3164(32) (stating "New town" means an urban activity center and
community designated on the future land use map of sufficient size, population, and land use
composition to support a variety of economic and social activities consistent with an urban area
designation. New towns shall include basic economic activities; all major land use categories,
with the possible exception of agricultural and industrial; and a centrally provided full range of
public facilities and services that demonstrate internal trip capture. A new town shall be based
on a master development plan.).
61. Town of Tioga, http://www.townoftioga.com/our-town/out-town/green-living (last
visited June 12, 2012).
62. This information was gathered using
1) Gainesville City Limits, which can be found at http://www.cityofgainesville.
org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket-FZIaNI5bLx8%3D&tabid=127 (last visited June
12, 2012);
2) the address provided for the Tioga Town Center, at http://www.tiogatown
center.com/location.php; and
3) Google Maps (www.googlemaps.com) (last visited June 12, 2012).
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3. Hypothetical #2
Developer #2 wants to redevelop an older (not historic)
neighborhood that has become neglected and partially condemned by
the city. The unfortunate combination of a hurricane and disrepair
caused extensive damage, and most of the residents took the insurance
money and left several years ago. The neighborhood is within city limits
and in a mainly residential area. The nearest grocery store and gas
station are just over a mile away. The neighborhood has a small park in
the center, and the existing utility and water infrastructure needs repair
as a result of the hurricane damage. The roads also need work.
Developer #2 wants to rebuild the neighborhood into single family
homes with no mixed uses. Replacing and updating the infrastructure
will be expensive, and bringing the roads up to usable standards will not
only be expensive, but will not benefit anyone but the residents.
Developer intends to replace the park with more homes instead of
upgrading the park. He has no special plans to promote the conservation
of water or energy.
Unfortunately for Developer #2, he has not met four of the eight
factors. At most, he has met factors I, II, and V just by being in a
previously developed area. But without more, his project is one factor
short of being determined to discourage urban sprawl even though he is
inside city limits in an area that needs rejuvenation. On its face, this
project seems like it should be declared "not urban sprawl," especially
when compared with the project from Hypothetical #1. But that is not
the case. However, DCP may still decide that this project does not
encourage urban sprawl. The purpose of this hypothetical is to illustrate
that the CPA does not particularly encourage infill and redevelopment.
B. Step 2: The Thirteen PrimaryIndicatorsand the Definition
The shortfalls of the CPA do not end with the institution of the eight
factors. If the future land use element or plan amendment does not meet
the four factors, the complexities compound. Just because a plan or
amendment does not discourage urban sprawl according to the eight
factors, that does not mean it will be found to encourage urban sprawl.
To make that determination, DPC looks at the thirteen primary
indicators and the definition. The thirteen primary indicators are
provided to help identify when an amendment does not discourage
urban sprawl, but the statute does not indicate how many factors must
be triggered in order for an amendment to be said to encourage urban
sprawl. Nor does it prevent a project from going forward even if all the
primary indicators are present. It is not clear what role the definition
plays in considering the thirteen primary indicators. And it is unclear
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whether the definition or the thirteen primary indicators should be
examined first, or what to do if an amendment meets either the
definition, or the primary indicators, but not the other.
So even if an amendment does not trigger four of the eight factors, it
may still not be urban sprawl if it fails to significantly trigger any of the
thirteen primary indicators or meet every element of the definition.
Developers may argue that even if an amendment triggers some of the
thirteen primary indicators, if it does not meet every element of the
definition it should not be considered urban sprawl. Similarly, even if it
meets the definition, a developer may argue that it does not trigger
enough of the thirteen primary indicators to be considered urban sprawl.
Moreover, note that section 163.3177(6)(a)(9)(a) says that the
thirteen factors are to be considered "within the context of features and
characteristics unique to each locality in order to determine whether the
plan amendment [meets any of the thirteen primary indicators]." Section
9(b) does not contain any such charge-the eight factors may be
considered in isolation.
It is an established rule of statutory construction that courts must
presume that the Legislature has a purpose for everything it enacts, and
that it had some purpose in using the particular language used in the
statute. 63 Further, courts must give statutes their plain and obvious
meaning, 64 and it must be assumed that the legislative body knew the
plain and ordinary meaning of the words. 65 Moreover, different sections
of a statute must be read in harmony with one another. 66 Additionally,
different wording in different parts of the statute mean the Legislature
intended a different meaning for those sections. 67 Despite all these rules,
it is still not clear how to reconcile the two competing statute sections to
determine what constitutes urban sprawl, even in absence of the eight
factors. The inclusion of the eight factors complicates interpretation

63.

See, e.g., State v. M.M., 407 So. 2d 987, 990 (Fla 4th DCA 1981) (stating "[i]n the

interpretation of a statute, it will be presumed that the legislature intended every part thereof for
a purpose, and that it had some purpose in introducing the particular language used in an
enactment.") (quoting Fla. Jur. 1st Statutes § 118).
64. See, e.g., State v. Buckner, 472 So. 2d 1228, 1229 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (declaring "in
the absence of a statutory definition, we shall assume the common or ordinary meaning of the
word."); State v. Little, 400 So. 2d 197, 198 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (stating "[i]f the legislature

uses a word without defining it then its common or ordinary meaning applies.").
65. See, e.g., Rinker Materials Corp. v. City of N. Miami, 286 So. 2d 552, 553 (Fla.
1973); Brooks v. Anastasia Mosquito Control Dist., 148 So. 2d 64, 66 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963).
66. See, e.g., Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 199 (Fla. 2007); § 118,
48A Fla. Jur 2d Statutes.
67. See, e.g., Maddox v. State, 923 So. 2d 442, 446 (Fla. 2006) (citing as a rule of
statutory construction "[the legislative use of different terms in different portions of the same
statute is strong evidence that different meanings were intended.") (citations omitted).
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Confusion exists not only between the definition and the primary
indicators, but also in the definition itself. As discussed above, the
Legislature is assumed to know the meanings of the words used in a
statute. 69 Moreover, unless context dictates otherwise, the word "and"
is presumed to be used as a conjunction.7 °
The Community Planning Act defines urban sprawl as being
characterized by low density, automobile-dependent development with
either a single use or multiple uses that are not functionally related,
requiring the extension of public facilities and services in an inefficient
manner, and failing to provide a clear separation between urban and
rural uses. 71 Here is a scenario in which a development will be high
density, but still meets the other criteria of sprawl based on the
definition. It will likely trip many of the thirteen primary indicators;
however, the decision of whether the definition or the thirteen primary
indicators controls may lead to different outcomes.
1. Hypothetical #3
For the purposes of this hypothetical, details are not important.
Imagine that Developer #3 wants to create a high-density development.
This development is automobile dependant, and has no mixed uses. It
does not have a clear separation of urban and rural uses. It requires the
extension of public facilities. Under the plain language of the definition,
because of the word "and," this might not be urban sprawl because it is
high-density. Simply by omitting any one of the 5 factors listed in the
definition, an amendment may escape classification as urban sprawl.
However, it is likely that this hypothetical development would trip more
than one of the thirteen primary indicators.
It is in this scenario that the statute becomes most opaque. If DCP or
the Administrative Commission looks to the definition first, it may
68. See Appendix 1 for a chart comparing elements and issues addressed by each of the
three relevant parts of the statute.
69. See supra note 61; American Bankers Ins. Group v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328,
1332 (1lth Cir. 2005).
70. American Bankers, 408 F.3d at 1332 (also stating "The word 'and' is therefore to be
accepted for its conjunctive connotation rather than as a word interchangeable with 'or' except
where strict grammatical construction will frustrate clear legislative intent."). Note the
frustration of intent must be great for the court to read "and" as "or"--the court cited the
example of Peacock v. Lubbock Compress Co., 252 F.2d 892, 893-95 (5th Cir. 1958)
(construing "and" in the phrase "an employer engaged in... the ginning and compressing of
cotton" as meaning "or" because "it is an acknowledged undisputed fact... that compressing is
an operation entirely removed from ginning and that the two are never carriedon together.")
(emphasis in American Bankers)).
71. FLA. STAT. § 163.3164(51) (2011).

[Vol. 23

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

decide that the development is not urban sprawl because it does not
meet all the listed criteria. However, if it looks to the thirteen primary
indicators first, then it may decide that it is urban sprawl. If it looks at
both, it is unclear.
2. Final Analysis
Ultimately, the statute has created four categories of amendments:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Urban Sprawl by Definition
Urban Sprawl by the Thirteen Primary Indicators
Not Urban Sprawl by the Eight Factors
Not Urban Sprawl because it does not adequately trigger either
the thirteen primary indicators or the definition.

There will certainly be overlap between the categories, especially
between categories one and two. And only Category Three provides any
real certainty. See Figure 1, below. The numbers in parentheses are the
categories listed above.

Figure 1

Has 4 of 8
factors
Does not
have 4 of 8
factors

Has few
primary indicators
Not Urban
Sprawl (3)
[Probably] Not
Urban Sprawl* (4)

Has many
primary indicators
Not Urban
Sprawl (3)
[Probably] Urban
Sprawl* (2)

Fits Definition
Not Urban
Sprawl (3)
May be Urban
Sprawl* (1)

Doesn't Fit
Definition
Not Urban
Sprawl (3)
[Probably]
Not Urban
Sprawl* (4)

*Dependson how the DCP orAdministrative Commission decides to weigh the definition
againstthe thirteen primary indicators

The silver lining of the statute is the obvious attempt to discourage
urban sprawl. The Legislature has made evident by writing the
provisions discussed here that the legislative intent is to discourage
urban sprawl. In going forward, this intent will guide judges trying to
interpret the statute, potentially resulting in more projects being
rejected for encouraging urban sprawl. The catch here is that courts will
72. See Bordan v. E.-European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 2006) (stating "[it is a
fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that legislative intent is the "polestar" that
guides this Court's interpretation.") (citing State v. J.M., 824 So. 2d 105, 109 (Fla. 2002)).
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not resort to statutory construction where the plain language of the
statute is clear and unambiguous, 73 such as the "shall be determined"
language preceding the eight factors. In order to even get to the intent
stage, the developer must first fail the four-of-eight factors test.
However, because there are two sections of the statute (the definition
and the thirteen primary indicators) that illustrate what urban sprawl is,
DCA or Administrative Commission may conceivably use either one to
strike down a project as urban sprawl. Of course, it also means that
either one may be used to uphold a project as not encouraging urban
sprawl.
Another positive facet of the statute is that if the Administrative
Commission or the DCP looks at the thirteen primary indicators, they
are likely to use precedent from when the thirteen primary indicators
were in Rule 9J-5,7 4 which may lend some stability to the process.
Further, because the thirteen primary indicators are the same as they
appeared in 9J-5, it is more likely that amendments that were considered
urban sprawl under 9J-5 will also be considered urban sprawl under the
CPA. Similarly, amendments which were not urban sprawl under 9J-5
are unlikely to be considered urban sprawl now. In short, because the
language is the same, and the state land planning agency is essentially
the same, the analysis of the thirteen primary indicators should also be
essentially the same. The difficulty lies in determining what weight to
give the thirteen primary indicators compared to the eight factors and
the definition, and how the Administrative Commission will treat the
process and the statutes.
However, the negatives outweigh the positives in this case. Although
the Community Planning Act provides flexibility, that flexibility comes
at the high price of uncertainty. 75 There are no hard and fast rules about
what does not discourage urban sprawl, only about what does.
The hypotheticals above show the darkest side of the statute-that it
is incomplete and uncertain. The statute does not cover the "pop-up"
villages like the one in Hypothetical #1, and does not go out of its way
to promote infill like in Hypothetical #2. In fact, it promotes, in a way,
classic urban sprawl in the isolated or leapfrog form.76 Depending on
the area to be developed, it may be easier for developers to create new
73. Id. (stating "when the statute is clear and unambiguous, courts will not look behind
the statute's plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction to
ascertain intent.") (citations and internal punctuation omitted).
74. However, this is an open question-it is not yet clear if the Administrative
Commission and DCP will rely on that precedent. Telephone Interview with David Powell,
accomplished attorney at Hopping, Green, and Sams, Sept. 2011.
75. Charles Pattison, ER. Bartley Lecture Series, Oct. 27, 2011 (stating that consumers
like flexibility with certainty, but that the CPA provided flexibility with uncertainty).
76. See supra note 15.
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communities that have traditionally been considered sprawl than to
create urban infill. And this statute gives those projects the green light.
While overall the language may be helpful for developers by giving
them a more definite standard as to what is not urban sprawl, in doing
so, the Legislature has essentially created an impressive escape hatch to
get around the thirteen primary indicators and the definition.
As a practical matter, there is an order in which practitioners should
present their arguments. First, they should make every effort to meet
four of the eight factors listed in § 163.3177(6)(a)(9)(b). Upon failure of
step one, practitioners may try to show that although the amendment
does not discourage urban sprawl according to the eight factors, it does
not encourage urban sprawl either, under the thirteen primary indicators
or the definition. How that will play out is as of yet uncertain.
CONCLUSION

The Florida legislature has stated that is wishes to discourage urban
sprawl. Given the vast number of social, economic, and environmental
problems linked to urban sprawl, this decision is not surprising,
especially in Florida, where the unique landscape has already been
damaged by the effects of urban sprawl. However, the CPA as enacted,
essentially only pays lip service to this goal by stating it wants to deter
sprawl at the same time opening the door for developments that have
been considered urban sprawl in the past. This legislation fails to
achieve its own stated goal.
The eight factors enacted by the Legislature changed urban growth
language and the thirteen primary indicators from tools to toys, from
means to limit urban sprawl to something to be played with by
developers. By including the eight factors, which by the plain language
of the statute control a determination of whether something is not urban
sprawl, the Legislature has opened a mile-wide loophole that allows
development that has traditionally been considered urban sprawl to be
classified as actually discouraging urban sprawl. Moreover, if a plan
amendment does not meet four of the eight factors, the process does not
get any simpler. The confusion about the interplay between the thirteen
primary indicators and the definition only leads to more ambiguity.
Ultimately, the muddle of possibilities created by the statutory language
creates uncertainty and fails to discourage urban sprawl. In fact, the
Florida Legislature has accidently encouraged urban sprawl once again.
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Appendix 1
A Comparison of Elements in the Definition, the 13 Primary
Indicators,and the 8 Factors
Definition
Density

V

Automobile
Dependent
Functional Relation
of single or multiple
uses
Public Facilities and
services
Clear separation of
urban/rural uses
Substantial Distance
Radial, Strip,
Isolated, or Ribbon
Pattern
Protection and
Conservation of
Natural Resources
Protection of
Agriculture
Time/money/energy
of providing/
maintaining services
Mixed Use

V/
"

13 Primary
Indicators
V/

*
*

"

,

V

"

"
__

V
/

/

"

,
"

/

Infill

V

Accessibility of
linked uses
Open Space

/

Multimodal
Transportation

8 Factors

/

"

/
/
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Balance of uses
based on demand
Innovative
Development
Pattern
* Similar considerations.

A few notes on this image:
Only one category, public facilities, is considered in all three parts of
the statute.
While many elements are mentioned in more than one place (for
example, density is mentioned in both the definition and the primary
indicators), the statutory language is rarely the same between the
definition, the thirteen primary indicators, and the eight factors.
Statutory construction rules require that separate parts of the same
statute that have different wording must be given different meanings.
See, e.g. Maddox v. State, 923 So.2d 442, 446 (Fla. 2006) (citing as a
rule of statutory construction "[t]he legislative use of different terms in
different portions of the same statute is strong evidence that different
meanings were intended.") (citations omitted).
Similarly, although some categories seem alike, (for example,
"automobile dependant" and "multimodal transportation"), statutory
construction again requires that separate parts of the same statute that
have different wording must be given different meanings. Id.

